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reland and Nevada share several important characteristic, as reflected  in table below. 
They have similar populations (2.7 to 4.5 million) and similar levels of GDP ($120-200 
billion).  The  most  important  similarity  is,  however,  that  they  both  experienced  an 
exceptionally strong housing boom – and bust. The result of the same boom-bust cycle for 
the real economy can be seen in the unemployment rate, which followed an almost identical 
pattern as shown in Figure 1. 
Table 1. Ireland and Nevada compared 
   Nevada  Ireland 
Population (in million, 2011)  2.7  4.5 
GDP (in $ billion, 2011)  120  200 
Average net migration rate since 
‘bust’ (2008) as percent of total 
population  0.32%  0.09% 
Unemployment rate (2011)  13.5%  14.4% 
Sources: Eurostat and BEA, US Census Bureau. 
However, there is one fundamental difference between the two: when the boom turned to 
bust, Nevada did not experience any local financial crisis and the state government did not 
have to be bailed out. 
The key difference between Nevada and Ireland is that banking problems in the US are taken 
care  of  at  the  federal  level  (the  US  is  a  banking  union),  whereas  in  the  euro  area, 
responsibility for banking losses remains national. 
Local  banks  in  Nevada  experienced  huge  losses  (just  like  in Ireland)  and  many  of  them 
became insolvent, but this did not lead to any disruption of the local banking system as these 
banks were seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which covered the 
losses and transferred the operations to other, stronger banks.  In 2008-09, the FDIC thus 
closed 11 banks headquartered in the state, with assets of over $40 billion, or about 30% of 
state GDP. The losses for the FDIC in these rescue/restructuring operations amounted to 
about $4 billion.   
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Figure 1. The boom/bust cycle in unemployment: Ireland vs. Nevada 
 
Sources: Eurostat and US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS). 
Other losses were borne at the federal level when residents of Nevada defaulted in large 
numbers on their home mortgages.  The two federal institutions that re-finance mortgages 
have lost between them about $8 billion since 2008.  
The  federal  institutions  of  the  US  banking  union  thus  provided  Nevada  with  a  ‘shock’ 
absorber  of  about  10%  of  GDP,  not  in  the  form  of  loans,  but  in  the  form  of  an  (ex-post) 
transfer  because  losses  of  this  magnitude  were  borne  at  the  federal  level.  (Against  this 
transfer one would of course have to set the insurance premia paid by banks in Nevada prior 
to the bust.  But they are likely to have been an order of magnitude smaller.) 
Of course, a lot of the banking business in Nevada was (and still is) conducted by ‘foreign’ 
banks, i.e. by out-of-state banks, which just took the losses from their Nevada operations on 
their books and could set them against profits made elsewhere.1  This is another way in 
which an integrated banking market can provide insurance against local financial shocks. 
One might call this a ‘private’ banking union (or a truly integrated banking market). It is 
impossible to estimate the size of this additional shock absorber, but the losses absorbed by 
out-of-state banks might very well have been as large again as the ones borne by the federal 
institutions. 
                                                   
1 The experience of Washington Mutual (WaMu) constitutes a somewhat special case. The biggest 
bank  to  have  failed  in  US  history,  a  mortgage  specialist,  WaMu  had  its  headquarters  in  Nevada 
(although the name suggests otherwise) and some small operations there.  However, its failure did not 
lead to any local losses as Washington Mutual was seized by the FDIC and its banking operations 
were sold for a very low sum to another large US bank (JP Morgan Chase) – but without any loss for 
the FDIC.  Such an ‘overnight’ operation would have been impossible in Europe where no euro area 
wide institution would have carried through a cross border takeover of this size. Moreover, WaMu 
received about $80 billion in low-cost financing from the US Federal Home Loan Bank. Irish banks 
received  massive  amounts  of  low-cost  emergency  liquidity  assistance  from  the  European  Central 
Bank, but the Central Bank of Ireland had to guarantee these loans, which was not the case for any 
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In Europe, this ‘private’ banking union also does not exist. Only the Baltic countries, whose 
banks are held to a large extent in foreign hands, benefited from a similar protection against 
losses provided by the Scandinavian headquarters of their local banks. By contrast, most of 
the real estate lending in Ireland (and Spain) had been extended by local banks so that most 
of the losses remained local (without any federal institution to provide insurance).   
The comparison between Nevada and Ireland thus illustrates very well the shock-absorbing 
capacity of an integrated banking system and a banking union. For Nevada, the banking 
union  resulted  in  a  transfer  worth  over  10%, possibly  up  to  20%  of  its  GDP.  Nevada  is 
admittedly an extreme example of the housing boom and bust. Nevertheless, this example 
illustrates the general point that a banking union can provide more shock-absorbing capacity 
than could ever be provided by any ‘fiscal capacity’ that is currently being contemplated for 
the euro area. 
 